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I. INTRODUCTION 
When bullets started to rain down from the 32nd floor of the Mandalay Bay 
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Resort and Casino into a crowd of 22,000 concertgoers, hysteria ensued.1 From 
1,200 feet away, the Route 91 Harvest Festival crowd did not immediately realize 
they were hearing gunfire, but rather just assumed the loud popping sound was 
from a firework.2 Little did the crowd know it was witnessing what some news 
outlets would call the “deadliest mass shooting in modern American history.”3 
Concertgoers trampled each other as they attempted to escape from the open 
concert grounds.4 Some concertgoers jumped walls, others climbed over cars, but 
they all were running for their lives as they tried to escape the falling bullets.5 For 
11 minutes, gambler-turned-gunman Stephen Paddock fired down into the crowd, 
carrying out his plan of attack with an arsenal of weapons.6 In preparation for his 
attack, Paddock stockpiled a total of 24 guns in two separate rooms, which were 
brought through the hotel in 21 suitcases over the course of about 6 days.7 
Paddock killed 58 people and injured more than 850 before taking his own life.8 
In the United States, litigation often follows such a shocking event.9 
However, in this situation, instead of a typically-structured lawsuit where victims 
seek redress for their injuries by suing the culpable party, MGM Resorts 
International, hereafter MGM, filed suit against the victims of the attack.10 In a 
typically-structured lawsuit, MGM likely would be a defendant because it owns 
both the hotel where Paddock took cover and the grounds where the shooting 
 
1.  Dan Hernandez, ‘It Was Hysteria. People Were Trampled’: Panic as Las Vegas Gunman Opened Fire, 
THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/oct/02/las-vegas-shooting-hysteria-
witnesses (on file with The University of Pacific Law Review); Gil Kaufman, Detailed Timeline of Las Vegas 
Route 91 Shooting Emerges, BILLBOARD (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.billboard.com/articles/news/7989241/las-
vegas-shooting-timeline-route-91 (on file with The University of Pacific Law Review). 
2.  Gil Kaufman, supra note 1.  
3.  Huchinson et al., The Anatomy of the Las Vegas Mass Shooting, The Deadliest in Modern U.S. 
History, ABC NEWS (Dec. 23, 2018), https://abcnews.go.com/US/anatomy-las-vegas-mass-shooting-deadliest-
modern-us/story?id=59797324 (on file with The University of Pacific Law Review). 
4.  Dan Hernandez, supra note 1. 
5.  Id. 
6.  Tom Winter et al., Las Vegas Shooter Stephen Paddock Wired $100,000 to Philippines Last Week, 
NBC NEWS (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/las-vegas-shooting/las-vegas-shooter-wired-
100-000-philippines-last-week-n807141(on file with The University of Pacific Law Review); Associated Press, 
Las Vegas, Country Music Mark One Year Since Route 91 Mass Shooting: ‘Tragedy of Grand Scale’, 
BILLBOARD (Oct. 1, 2018), 
https://www.billboard.com/articles/columns/country/8477586/route-91-las-vegas-country-music-mark-one-
year-anniversary-mass-shooting (on file with The University of Pacific Law Review). 
7.  Huchinson et al., supra note 3.  
8.  Id. 
9.  See e.g., Benjamin Weiser, Family and United Airlines Settle Last 9/11 Wrongful-Death Lawsuit, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 18, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/20/nyregion/last-911-wrongful-death-suit-is-
settled.html (on file with The University of Pacific Law Review) (discussing the eighty-five lawsuits arising 
from the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001). 
10.  See Complaint for Declaratory Relief at 1, MGM v. Carlos Acosta, No. 2:18-cv-01288 (D. Nev. July 
13, 2018) (listing the plaintiffs in the complaint as: MGM Resorts International, Mandalay Resort Group, 
Mandalay Bay, LLC, Mandalay Corporation, MGM Resorts Festival Grounds, LLC, and MGM Resorts Venue 
Management, LLC). 
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took place.11 Instead, MGM became the plaintiff when it sought a declaratory 
judgment in order to shield itself from any liability arising from the attack.12 
MGM relies on the applicability of the federal SAFETY Act of 2002.13 The 
SAFETY Act of 2002 became law shortly after the terrorist attacks on September 
11th, 2001.14 The Act limits liability arising from terrorist attacks to only anti-
terrorism technology providers, and protects the party who contracted with a 
federally recognized security provider, or a down-stream buyer.15 Through its use 
of this narrow federal statute with no prior litigation history, MGM flipped the 
standard litigation structure in order to control potential lawsuits against it and 
determine where and when victims of the Route 91 attack can seek redress.16 
This Comment uses the facts of the Route 91 shooting and subsequent 
litigation tactics as a framework for exploring: 1) whether the SAFETY Act, a 
federal statute designed to limit damages resulting from international terrorism 
and protect the airline industry, applies in this case; and 2) whether this statute is 
being used as a tactic for the defense bar to take control of litigation and prevent 
victims from deciding where and when to sue.17 In light of these issues, this 
Comment also discusses the currently available methods to resolve mass tort 
litigation, and Congress’ failure to enact an all-encompassing solution to the 
complexities of mass tort litigation.18 
Part II of this Comment provides background information about the Route 91 
Harvest Festival shooting.19 Part III discusses the ensuing litigation and parties’ 
theories.20 Part IV provides a brief synopsis of the SAFETY Act of 2002.21 In 
Part V, this Comment argues that MGM’s use of the SAFETY Act is improper 
because it expands the Act’s purpose beyond what the enacting Congress 
intended.22 Part VI raises the question of whether MGM is using the SAFETY 
Act as a bill of peace, or tactic to take advantage of litigation, and forum shop for 
federal court.23 Part VII argues the SAFETY Act should not be applied in this 
 
11.  Chris Morris, Here’s Why MGM Is Suing the Las Vegas Shooting Victims, FORTUNE (July 17, 2018), 
http://fortune.com/2018/07/17/mgm-sues-las-vegas-shooting-victims/http://fortune.com/2018/07/17/mgm-sues-
las-vegas-shooting-victims/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
12.  Id. 
13.  Complaint for Declaratory Relief, MGM v. Carlos Acosta, No. 2:18-cv-01288 (D. Nev. July 13, 
2018).  
14.  Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C.A. §§ 441–44 (West 2002); CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 
Proceedings and Debates of the 107th Congress, Extensions of Remarks, at E2079 (Nov. 13, 2002) (on file with 
The University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing Mr. Armey’s remarks in support of the SAFETY Act of 
2002).  
15.  Infra Part IV. 
16.  Infra Part II. 
17.  Infra Parts IV–V. 
18.  Infra Part VI. 
19.  Infra Part II. 
20.  Infra Part III.  
21.  Infra Part IV.  
22.  Infra Part V. 
23.  Infra Part VI.  
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case because it would expand the purpose of statute beyond what Congress 
intended.24 
II. THE ROUTE 91 HARVEST FESTIVAL SHOOTING 
On September 25, 2017, Stephen Paddock drove from his Mesquite, Nevada 
home, 74 miles outside of Las Vegas, and checked into the Mandalay Bay Resort 
& Casino.25 Later, he reserved an adjoining suite under his girlfriend’s name, 
who was in the Philippines at the time, and wired her $100,000.26 MGM 
considered the 64-year-old “former accountant and realtor, who had once 
amassed a $2.1 million fortune,” a high roller and gave him VIP treatment upon 
arrival.27 Over several trips back and forth from his home to the Mandalay Bay, 
Paddock stockpiled a total of 21 weapon-filled suitcases.28 MGM’s security video 
showed Paddock using both guest and service elevators during his stay, 
occasionally even being accompanied by hotel staff.29 
At 10:05 p.m. on October 1st, Paddock began his attack on the crowd below 
by breaking the window of his room.30 As police and hotel staff responded to the 
attack, they were greeted with gunfire.31 Police subsequently noticed the room 
service carts that Paddock asked to be left in his room were rigged with “a small 
surveillance camera hidden under a plate and pointed down the hallway at them;” 
therefore, stopping him would be more difficult.32 Once police were able to enter 
the room, they found Paddock dead with more than “1,000 spent gun shell cases 
and an arsenal of weapons.”33 They also found over 5,000 unused rounds of 
ammunition.34 Paddock’s intentions had “gone unnoticed by hotel staff members 
who had gone in and out of his room.”35 As a result, all that stood between him 
and his title as the man behind the “largest mass shooting in modern American 
history” were two glass windows.36 
 
24.  Infra Part VII. 
25.  Huchinson et al., supra note 3.  
26.  Winter et al., supra note 6. 
27.  Id. 
28.  Huchinson et al., supra note 3.  
29.  Vivian Yee, Video Shows Las Vegas Gunman Gambling, Eating Alone and Filling His Suite with 
Guns, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/22/us/las-vegas-shooting-stephen-
paddock.html (on file with The University of Pacific Law Review). 
30.  Huchinson et al., supra note 3.  
31.  Id. 
32.  Id. 
33.  Id. 
34.  Id. 
35.  Jose A. Del Real & Jonah Engel Bromwich, Stephen Paddock, Las Vegas Suspect, was a Gambler 
Who Drew Little Attention, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/02/us/stephen-
paddock-vegas-shooter.html (on file with The University of Pacific Law Review). 
36.  Kaufman, supra note 1.  
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III. ENSUING LITIGATION 
Ordinarily, victims of such an attack would sue the perpetrator for damages; 
however, because wrongdoers are often insolvent, victims look for deep pocket 
defendants.37 In this situation, some victims of Paddock’s attack followed the 
typical path of litigation and became plaintiffs seeking redress for their injuries 
based on tort law.38 In their lawsuits, the victims alleged the hotel operator and 
the hotel owner “fail[ed] to properly monitor Paddock’s activities, train staff 
members and employ adequate security measures.”39 
Specifically, one victim alleged the hotel was “negligent or grossly 
negligent” because it did not take adequate precautions to prevent Paddock from 
amassing so many weapons in his room, and “employees were not adequately 
trained to notice and report suspicious activity.”40 Another complaint alleged that 
MGM breached its duty by failing to “properly surveil people coming and 
going,” “monitor with a closed-circuit television,” respond or act once a hotel 
security guard was shot six minutes prior to Paddock’s attack on the 
concertgoers, and notice Paddock’s surveillance set up outside of his room.41 
Other victims alleged “Live Nation was negligent for failing to provide 
adequate exits and properly train staff for an emergency.”42 Again, these initial 
lawsuits were based on the typical structure of tort litigation where injured 
plaintiffs are the masters of their own cases.43 However, all the victims dismissed 
their cases, signaling their intent to refile and collaborate with other victims.44 
 
37.  See Anna Almendrala, Some Las Vegas Shooting Victims May Get Shut Out of Donated Funds, 
HUFFPOST (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/las-vegas-victims-donation-
compensation_us_5a2f6581e4b046175432d088 (on file with The University of Pacific Law Review) (“The hard 
truth is that in many instances, there isn’t a negligent party that’s capable of paying out those monies . . . 
[c]ertainly the shooter is both criminally and negligently responsible for the death, but the shooter’s estate is not 
going to have money to compensate hundreds of people.”); Patricia Mazzei, Parkland Victims’ Families Sue, 
Claiming Negligence in Mass Shooting, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/10/us/parkland-lawsuits-safety.html (on file with The University of Pacific 
Law Review) (discussing the twenty-two lawsuits filed against the police department and school district on 
behalf of victims of a mass shooting in Parkland, Florida).  
38.  Tina Bellon, Hundreds of Las Vegas Shooting Victims File Lawsuits in California Court, THOMSON 
REUTERS (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lasvegas-shooting-lawsuit/hundreds-of-las-vegas-
shooting-victims-file-lawsuits-in-california-court-idUSKBN1DK2OX?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews 
(on file with The University of Pacific Law Review). 
39.  Id. 
40.  Kate Taylor, A 21-year-old Who Was Shot in the Chest During the Las Vegas Shooting Is Suing the 
Mandalay Bay Hotel, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.businessinsider.com/las-vegas-victim-lawsuit-
2017-10 (on file with The University of Pacific Law Review). 
41.  Complaint, Paige Gasper v. MGM, No. A-17-762858-C (Nev. Dist. Ct. 2017). 
42.  Tina Bellon, supra note 38. 
43.  See Simpson v. Alaska State Comm’n for Human Rights, 608 F.2d 1171, 1174 (9th Cir. 1979) (“A 
plaintiff ordinarily is free to decide who shall be parties to his lawsuit.”). 
44.  Mark Berman, Mandalay Bay Hotel Owner Files Lawsuits Against Las Vegas Massacre Victims, 
Saying It Has ‘No Liability of Any Kind,’ THE WASHINGTON POST (July 17, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2018/07/17/mandalay-bay-hotel-owner-files-lawsuits-
against-las-vegas-massacre-victims-saying-it-has-no-liability-of-any-kind/?utm_term=.09d893f2d37f (on file 
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Then, on July 13, 2018, MGM became the plaintiff and filed a declaratory 
judgment action against some of the victims of the attack.45 In these actions, 
MGM used the federal SAFETY Act of 2002 to file federal lawsuits in Nevada, 
California, Arizona, Utah, Texas, New York, and Alaska.46 MGM argues the 
federal SAFETY Act applies in this case because not only did Paddock’s actions 
constitute a terrorist attack under the Act, but MGM also hired a federally 
certified technology company, the Contemporary Services Corporation (“CSC”),  
to provide security at the Route 91 grounds.47 MGM alleges the Act applies to all 
of the Defendants’ potential claims arising from the incident, and the Act 
precludes “any finding of liability against the Plaintiffs for any claim for injuries 
arising out of or related to Paddock’s mass attack.”48 In fact, the Plaintiffs allege 
that they have no liability of any kind arising from the attack.49 
In its complaint, MGM ignores any argument that it was negligent due to its 
failure to regulate security at the hotel leading up to Paddock’s attack.50 Instead, 
MGM argues that the victims’ potential injuries could only be “because Paddock 
fired from his window and because they remained in the line of fire at the 
concert,” rather than their injuries being a result of MGM’s negligence at the 
hotel grounds.51 MGM states that “such claims implicate security at the concert– 
and may result in loss to CSC.”52 Therefore, to escape liability through the 
SAFETY Act, MGM alleges in its complaint that the only party who should be 
liable is the provider of the anti-terrorism technology.53 
Also, MGM claims the Act creates an exclusively federal cause of action, 
and it is the “exclusive claim available in such circumstances.”54 Therefore, 
because: 1) MGM retained Contemporary CSC to provide security at the Route 
91 Festival, and 2) the alleged injuries resulted from security failures at the 
 
with The University of Pacific Law Review). 
45.  Complaint for Declaratory Relief at 1 & 51, MGM v. Carlos Acosta, No. 2:18-cv-01288 (D. Nev. 
July 13, 2018).  
46.  Jason Tashea, MGM Resorts Uses an Obscure Law to Sue Las Vegas Mass Shooting Victims , ABA J. 
(July 17, 2018), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/mgm_resorts_uses_an_obscure_law_to_sue_las_vegas_mass_shooting
_victims/ (on file with The University of Pacific Law Review); Benson & Bingham, MGM Resorts’ Move to 
Preemptively Sue Shooting Victims Under the SAFETY Act (Aug. 2, 2018), 
https://www.bensonbingham.com/blog/mgm-moves-to-sue-shooting-victims-safety-act (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review). 
47.  Complaint for Declaratory Relief at 6, MGM v. Carlos Acosta, No. 2:18-cv-01288 (D. Nev. July 13, 
2018).  
48.  Id. at 55. 
49.  Id. 
50.  See generally Complaint for Declaratory Relief, MGM v. Carlos Acosta, No. 2:18-cv-01288 (D. Nev. 
July 13, 2018)). 
51.  Id. at 51. 
52.  Id. at 51.  
53.  Id. at 52.  
54.  Id. at 7. 
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concert, “for example security training, emergency response, evacuation, and 
adequacy of egress,”55 the SAFETY Act governs all actions and CSC should be 
the party liable for any damages.56 MGM claims the law shields it because it is 
either a buyer or down-stream user of the technology that caused injury.57 For 
clarification, MGM is arguing that because the SAFETY Act applies, it should 
not be liable for any injury at all.58 
If a court were to follow MGM’s theory and grant declaratory relief, injured 
victims would be preempted from filing their own lawsuits in a manner prefer 
because  the SAFETY Act would provide the exclusive claim available.59 For 
example, victims could not sue MGM for its negligent conduct at its own hotel 
grounds because the SAFETY Act allegedly removes MGM from liability all 
together.60 This would be the case even when the technology services at the 
concert, which are claimed to fall within the technologies described in the 
SAFETY Act, have nothing to do with the victims’ theory for negligence 
stemming from conduct at the hotel itself.61 Therefore, it is apparent that MGM’s 
use of the Act is an attempt to eliminate its liability, and take total control over 
the victims’ ability to file lawsuits where, when, and on what theory they 
choose.62 
IV. THE SAFETY ACT OF 2002 
In response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Congress passed 
the Homeland Security Act of 2002.63 This act consolidated 22 agencies and 
bureaus and established the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”).64 For 
example, some of these agencies are the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA), Transportation Security Agency (“TSA”), and Customs and 
Border Patrol (“CBP”).65 According to the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs, these agencies all work together in order to 
fulfill DHS’ mandate “to protect the homeland from the myriad threats that we 
 
55.  Id. at 6.  
56.  MGM’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Motion to Dismiss Pls.’ Complaint Seeking Declaratory Relief, MGM v. 
Carlos Acosta, No. 2:18-cv-01288-APG-PAL (D. Nev. 2018). 
57.  Complaint for Declaratory Relief at 7, MGM v. Carlos Acosta, No. 2:18-cv-01288 (D. Nev. July 13, 
2018).  
58.  Id. at 55.  
59.  Id.  
60.  Id. 
61.  Id. 
62.  Id. 
63.  U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 
https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/issues/homeland-security (last visited Aug. 4, 2019) (on file with The University 
of the Pacific Law Review).  
64.  Id. 
65.  Id. 
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face on our borders, at our ports, online and more.”66 
The Homeland Security Act contains many subsections; the SAFETY Act is 
one of the shorter sections within the Act.67 The SAFETY Act designates the 
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security as the party responsible for 
the administration of the Act, the determination of which anti-terrorism 
technologies qualify for protection, and whether an attack qualifies as a terrorist 
attack.68 For example, the Secretary determines when anti-terrorism technologies 
qualify for protection based on criteria within the Act.69 This includes situations 
where there is an “extraordinarily large or unquantifiable potential third party 
liability risk to the [s]eller or provider” of technology, and when there is a 
“substantial likelihood that such anti-terrorism technology will not be deployed 
unless protections under the system of risk management provided under this 
subtitle are extended.”70 The Secretary has “broad discretion in determining 
whether to designate a particular technology as a Qualified Anti-Terrorism 
Technology.”71 
Further, the Act creates an exclusively federal cause of action for claims 
arising out of an act of terrorism when: (1) qualified anti-terrorism technologies 
have been deployed in defense of the attack, and (2) the claims may result in loss 
to the seller, which may be any entity or person that sells qualified anti-terrorism 
technology).72 Once a party files a lawsuit under the SAFETY Act, a rebuttable 
presumption exists that the government contractor’s defense applies.73 A party 
may overcome this presumption by providing evidence that the “seller acted 
fraudulently or with willful misconduct in submitting information to the 
Secretary during the course of the Secretary’s” determination of the technology’s 
qualification under the Act.74 The government contractor defense offers 
protections to companies in situations where they complied with a federal 
government contract, but normally would be subject to liability without it.75 If the 
Act were applicable in this case, the government contractor’s defense would 
apply to whichever parties contracted with the federal government to provide 
services.76 Since CSC was the technology certified by the Secretary to provide 
 
66.  Id. 
67.  Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C.A. §§ 441–44 (West 2002). 
68.  Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C.A. § 441 (West 2002). 
69.  Id. 
70.  Id. 
71.  71 Fed. Reg. 110, 33147, 33148 (June 8, 2006) (to be codified at 6 C.F.R. pt. 25). 
72.  Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C.A. § 442 (West 2002). 
73.  Id. 
74.  Id. 
75.  Brian Coleman & Jennifer Moore, Government Contractor Defense: Military and Non-Military 
Applications, AM. BAR ASS’N (Sept. 12, 2016), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/products-liability/practice/2016/gvt-contractor-
defense-military-non-military-applications/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
76.  See e.g., Boyle v. United Technologies Corporation, 487 U.S. 500, 502, 505 (1988) (discussing the 
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and sell anti-terrorism technologies, the government contractor’s defense likely 
would apply to it.77 
Therefore, if the SAFETY Act were to apply in this case and the Secretary 
determines Paddock’s attack was a terrorist attack, the victims would be forced to 
litigate in the federal court MGM chose and face limited options in who they 
could seek redress from, likely only CSC.78 
V. WAS THE SAFETY ACT INTENDED TO BE USED THIS WAY? 
Based on an analysis of the statutory construction of the SAFETY Act of 
2002, Congress did not intend for potential defendants to use the Act to flip 
traditional litigation structure and shield themselves from all liability in situations 
like the Mandalay Bay shooting.79 Part A discusses how MGM could argue it is 
not liable for injuries resulting from the failures of CSC, but the text of the statute 
does not provide MGM with protection against claims alleging negligence 
distinct from CSC’s negligence.80 Part B argues that MGM’s use of the Act in 
this manner extends beyond Congress’ purpose in enacting the Act: to limit 
liability and prevent manufacturers from ceasing to create anti-terrorism 
technology.81 Lastly, Part C discusses the legislative history behind the Act, and 
argues the Act was intended to protect the airline industry from crippling liability 
as a result of terrorism, not shield major corporations from all negligence 
unrelated to anti-terrorism technologies.82 
A. The Text of the Statute 
The Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security possesses the power 
to determine what the term “act of terrorism” means based on the criteria listed in 
the Act.83 The Act defines “terrorism” as any act that is: 
(i) “unlawful, (ii) causes harm to a person, property, or entity in the United 
States, or in the case of a domestic United States air carrier or a United States-
flag vessel…in or outside the United States; and (iii) uses or attempts to use 
instrumentalities, weapons or other methods designed or intended to cause mass 
 
government contractor’s defense in association with United Technologies Corporation, who had a contract to 
manufacture helicopters for the government).  
77.  Complaint for Declaratory Relief at 46, MGM v. Carlos Acosta, No. 2:18-cv-01288 (D. Nev. July 13, 
2018) (“CSC’s security services were certified by the Secretary of Homeland Security under the SAFETY 
Act.”). 
78.  Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C.A. § 442 (West 2002).  
79.  Infra Parts A–C.  
80.  Infra Part A.  
81.  Infra Part B. 
82.  Infra Part C.  
83.  Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C.A. § 441 (West 2002). 
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destruction, injury or other loss to citizens or institutions of the United States.”84 
The Act’s broad definition could encompass the Route 91 attack because 
Paddock’s attack was unlawful, it caused harm by killing 58 people in the United 
States, and used weapons, specifically assault style rifles, designed to cause 
injury to citizens of the United States.85 
However, the Act states that there is a federal cause of action when the anti-
terrorism technology, in this case security systems from CSC, were “deployed in 
defense against such act and such claims result or may result in loss to the 
[s]eller.”86 The seller as stated in the Act is “[a]ny person or entity that sells or 
otherwise provides a qualified anti-terrorism technology.”87 Further, the Act 
states that “such claims shall be brought only for claims for injuries that are 
proximately caused by sellers that provide qualified anti-terrorism technology to 
Federal and non-Federal government customers.”88 
Therefore, even if the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security 
finds the security system that CSC provided qualifies as anti-terrorism 
technology, and Paddock’s attack qualify as an act of terrorism, the SAFETY Act 
applies to protect the seller from loss due to claims against them for injuries 
proximately created by the technology, not a third party.89 Therefore, the 
SAFETY Act of 2002 likely does not apply to protect MGM from claims arising 
out of its negligence at the hotel grounds but could apply to protect MGM and 
CSC from liability arising out of CSC’s negligence at the concert grounds.90 
B. The Purpose of the Statute 
If the court finds that MGM qualifies for protection as a seller, applying the 
Act in this situation would exceed the purpose for enacting the Act.91 Congress 
enacted the SAFETY Act of 2002 in response to the terrorist attacks of 
September 11th.92 The “purpose of the Act is to ensure that the threat of liability 
does not deter potential manufacturers or sellers of anti-terrorism technologies 
from developing, deploying, and commercializing technologies that could save 
lives.”93 In the Route 91 case, MGM’s lawsuit against the victims is to prevent its 
 
84.  Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C.A. § 444 (West 2002). 
85.  James Abundis, How Far Was the Las Vegas Shooter from the Concert?, BOSTON GLOBE (Oct. 2, 
2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2017/10/02/look-how-far-las-vegas-shooter-was-from-
concert/RH1IbGWenXPuSGg84YfqXN/story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
86.  Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C.A. § 442 (West 2002). 
87.  Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C.A. § 443 (West 2002).  
88.  Id. 
89.  Id. 
90.  Id. 
91.  Comm. on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 107th Congress 2d Sess. 107–75 (2002). 
92.  Id. 
93.  71 Fed. Reg. 110, 33147, 33148 (June 8, 2006) (to be codified at 6 C.F.R. pt. 25). 
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own liability, not the seller of the anti-terrorism technology.94 Allowing MGM to 
use the SAFETY Act to limit its liability does not fit within the purpose of the 
Act because it does not harm nor deter technology manufacturers or sellers from 
providing technology based on MGM’s liability.95 If the seller of the anti-
terrorism technology is not a member of the litigation and finding liability on 
behalf of another does not deter the seller from developing or deploying 
technologies, then the Act should be inapplicable to the Route 91 case because 
application would not further the Act’s purpose.96 
C. The Legislative History of the Statute 
In the wake of September 11th, lawmakers and policy experts realized “the 
threats to [national] security [were] no longer the same threats as we faced 
immediately after World War II,” and establishing the Department of Homeland 
Security would address these national security threats.97 President George W. 
Bush recognized a hundred different government agencies [had] some 
responsibilities for homeland security,” but no one had the ultimate 
accountability that was needed.98 The early committee reports from the 
Homeland Security Act state that prior to September 11th there was a “rising 
threat of international terrorism on U.S. soil,” and the National Commission on 
Terrorism “warned that international terrorists were increasingly seeking to 
inflict mass casualties, both overseas and within the United States.”99 
Initially, the proposed solution was that a “new department would provide 
new leadership on a range of homeland threats, including terrorism, by 
consolidating a range of federal agencies and programs responsible for border 
security, critical infrastructure protection, and emergency preparedness and 
response.”100 The Homeland Security Act specifically created the Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA) to combat attacks similar to the terrorist attacks 
that spurred this legislation.101 The SAFETY Act followed and logically limited 
liability running to security providers.102 
House majority leader Richard Armey supported the enactment of the 
 
94.  Complaint for Declaratory Relief, MGM v. Carlos Acosta, No. 2:18-cv-01288 (D. Nev. July 13, 
2018).  
95.  71 Fed. Reg. 110, 33147, 33148 (June 8, 2006) (to be codified at 6 C.F.R. pt. 25). 
96.  See Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Deterrence: The Legitimate Function of the Public Tort, 58 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1019, 1020 (“Public torts provide a mechanism that will encourage persons to take account of all 
the costs posed by their activities and, therefore, to invest efficiently in safety.”) (emphasis added). However, 
MGM is not the party producing or selling the technology; therefore, its liability should be unrelated to the 
deterrence felt by CSC. 
97.  Comm. on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 107th Congress 2d Sess. 107–75 (2002). 
98.  Id. 
99.  Id. 
100.  Id. 
101.  H. REP. NO. 107–609, pt. 1 (2002). 
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SAFETY Act because it could ensure important technologies can be made 
available to help protect our cities, schools, hospitals, nuclear power plants, 
bridges, dams, and other critical areas.”103 Further, he stated that “[w]e must not 
allow the litigation fallout from one act of terrorism to bankrupt a company that 
otherwise could have developed technology that could prevent another act of 
terrorism.”104 He further stated the SAFETY Act was “modeled after a similar 
provision in the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act.”105 
House majority leader Armey’s statements show what members of Congress 
were considering at the time of enactment.106 Although he stated it was Congress’ 
“hope and intent that the Secretary will use the necessary latitude to make this list 
[of technologies] as broad and inclusive as possible,” this Act’s purpose was to 
“insure that the maximum amount of protective technology and services become 
available.”107 However, Paddock’s attack was likely not what legislators and 
Congress had in mind when it enacted the Homeland Security Act, unless there 
was a relation between CSC’s security technology and the injuries.108 In fact, 
federal Judge Boulware “questioned how Contemporary Services Corporation’s 
services extended beyond people showing up and donning t-shirts,” and 
“want[ed] a CSC representative deposed as well as an MGM Festival Grounds 
representative familiar with the agreement between the companies.”109 It is 
unknown whether CSC provided any security that was designed to protect 
citizens, but failed.110 However, if it did not, the Act should not apply because 
CSC’s technology is not the protective technology Congress had in mind when 
enacting the SAFETY Act of 2002.111 
Further, the threats discussed related to, although were not limited to, foreign 
international terrorists committing a mass terrorist attack on United States soil or 
against the United States.112 The “lone wolf attacker” who killed 58 people in Las 
 
103.  107 RECORDCONG. REC. 11, 161 (2002) (discussing Mr. Armey’s remarks in support of the 
SAFETY Act of 2002). 
104.  Id. 
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107.  Id. 
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University of the Pacific Law Review). 
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110.  See Complaint for Declaratory Relief at 1, MGM v. Carlos Acosta, No. 2:18-cv-01288 (D. Nev. 
July 13, 2018) (failing to discuss the details of CSC’s security services). 
111.  See U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 9-11 Commission, 
Homeland Security, and Intelligence Reform, https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/issues/9-11-commission (on file 
with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing Senator Lieberman and McCain’s attempt to 
“prevent a catastrophic attack from happening again” by passing the Homeland Security Act in 2002 as a result 
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112.  107 CONG. REC. 11,161 (2002) (discussing Mr. Armey’s remarks in support of the SAFETY Act of 
2002). 
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Vegas is likely not similar enough to the international terrorist attack on 
September 11th to support the application of the SAFETY Act.113 The Homeland 
Security Act was passed in response to an attack on the airline industry and it 
created the TSA for protection against those types of attacks.114 The SAFETY 
Act followed within the Homeland Security Act and specifically limited liability 
to sellers of anti-terrorism technologies.115 These provisions work together to 
show that Congress’ purpose was to shield anti-terrorism technology providers 
from the potential liability from terrorist attacks, and to prevent the subsequent 
disincentivizing effect of that liability on their willingness to provide the 
technology that would now be required under the Homeland Security Act.116 
However, MGM bases its argument on language in the Regulations 
Implementing the Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies Act 
of 2002.117 Here, the Department of Homeland Security provided more 
clarification as to who is affected by the Act.118 The Department stated that a 
“cause of action may be brought only against the seller of the qualified anti-
terrorism technology and may not be brought against the buyers, the buyers’ 
contractors, downstream users of the qualified anti-terrorism technology, the 
seller’s suppliers or contractors, or any other person or entity.”119 It again stated 
that “it is clear that the seller is the only appropriate defendant in this exclusive 
Federal cause of action.”120 The Department elaborated by acknowledging that 
when enacting the Act, “Congress balanced the need to provide recovery to 
plaintiffs against the need to ensure adequate deployment of anti-terrorism 
technologies by creating a cause of action that provides a certain level of 
recovery against sellers, while at the same time protecting others in the supply 
chain.”121 
Although this language seems as though it would prevent victims from suing 
MGM as a buyer or downstream user of the technology, it is still unclear what 
claims would be made against MGM.122 If victims are not making claims related 
to the technology that CSC provided, MGM cannot argue that it is shielded by 
the SAFETY Act of 2002.123 Therefore, the traditional structure of litigation 
should take place and the victims should be allowed to make their cases alleging 
 
113.  Chris Baynes, Las Vegas Shooting: Police Believe Lone Gunman Was Responsible for Mass 
Shooting on Casino Strip, INDEPENDENT (Oct. 2, 2017), 
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117.  71 Fed. Reg. 110 (2006) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
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the negligence of their choice.124 
The text of the statute, the purpose of the statute, and the legislative history 
surrounding the Homeland Security Act of 2002 all show that the Route 91 
shooting was not the type of situation Congress imagined protecting against 
when enacting the SAFETY Act of 2002.125 MGM should not be able to sue 
victims under its support.126 
VI. IS MGM USING THE SAFETY ACT AS A BILL OF PEACE? 
The heart of MGM’s argument is that the SAFETY Act applies and shields 
MGM from litigation simply because it hired CSC to provide security services, 
and CSC should be the only party liable under the language of the Act.127 
However, the potential claims from victims are unknown because they have not 
all filed suits.128 In fact, some filed lawsuits directly alleging it was MGM’s 
negligence, rather than CSC’s, that lead to injuries.129 Therefore, should MGM be 
allowed to shield itself from liability by suing the victims before the victims file 
lawsuits for their specific grievances?130 
MGM is attempting to take control of the litigation and determine where and 
how the lawsuit takes place.131 This is not the traditional structure of tort 
litigation; the purpose of the traditional structure is to “provide relief to injured 
parties for harms caused by others” and “to impose liability on parties 
responsible for the harm.”132 Typically, modern “tort suits…begin with the 
plaintiff’s allegation that the defendant wronged her by breaching a duty not to 
injure her.”133 However, in this case, MGM has sued the victims, who likely 
would have a claim against them, before they even alleged MGM’s specific 
wrongdoing.134 Even if the language in the Act and the legislative history are 
debatable, a court should not allow MGM to move forward using this Act 
because this would be a drastic change in traditional law, and Congress has yet to 
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enact a tool that would allow this kind of action by a potential defendant.135 If, 
when passing the SAFETY Act, Congress intended to allow companies like 
MGM to flip traditional tort litigation and become the controller of lawsuits, it 
would have done so clearly.136 
First, subsection A defines a bill of peace.137 Next, subsection B discusses 
case law as examples where the ordinary defendants attempted to take control of 
litigation through interpleader actions.138 Lastly, subsection C discusses other 
methods Congress has adopted to create a solution to mass tort litigation.139 
A. What is a “Bill of Peace?” 
A bill of peace is an equitable device used to aggregate claims of “questions 
of law or fact which would otherwise be tried over and over” and determines a 
result “once for all in a single proceeding.”140 Proponents for bills of peace argue 
that the “avoidance of multiplicity of suits saves the parties from needless 
expense and vexation, economizes the time of judges and jurymen, and frees the 
dockets for the affairs of other litigants.”141 A bill of peace involves “several 
persons (conveniently called the multitude) on one side of a controversy, and one 
person (whom we may call the adversary) on the other side.”142 Typically, “each 
member of the multitude threatens litigation with the adversary, and these 
parallel litigations involve one or more common questions of law or fact, or 
both.”143 
Concerns about using a bill of peace as a solution to mass tort litigation 
involve “effects on rights to trial by jury, impacts on individual claimants’ 
choices of venue, potential trial problems from the degree of relatedness of 
claims that would be involved, possible delay, and whether a bill-of-peace 
proceeding could be adequately dispositive given individual issues.”144 However, 
defendants of mass tort litigation want to avoid extensive litigation because 
“litigating a multitude of claims over a wide geographic area may force [them to 
settle].”145 Therefore, defendants try to “simplify their task by having claims 
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consolidated.”146 Although defendants may want to create a bill of peace and deal 
with all litigation at once, Congress has never enacted a bill of peace.147 
American case authority requires more than an existing multiplicity of suits to try 
to use a bill of peace.148 Courts have “deemed it unfair to require a litigant to 
have contested in a single complex suit a right which is personal to him alone.”149 
Therefore, courts only recognize a bill of peace as proper when “multiplicity 
exists and when ‘common interest’ or ‘general interest’ binds the multiple parties 
together.”150 
MGM’s consolidation of victims in the Route 91 appears to be an attempt to 
create a bill of peace.151 However, MGM has not provided evidence to prove 
there is the necessary privity between the members of the multitude–the 
victims.152 Proving privity requires that “all of the multiple litigants would be 
indispensable or necessary parties to any action brought by any one of them,” and 
“seldom can damage actions springing from a mass tort satisfy such stringent 
criteria.153 In the Route 91 case, any one of the individual victims could bring a 
lawsuit against MGM for its negligence without needing the other injured parties 
in order to obtain a ruling.154 Therefore, MGM’s attempt to create a bill of peace 
would likely not hold up in court based on the elements of a bill of peace, which 
require that all of the multitude litigants are necessary to any action that any one 
of them bring. Even if it could meet all the elements for an equitable bill of peace 
in theory, again Congress has not enacted a statute recognizing a bill of peace, so 
it is unlikely it would do so through a federal statute without stating it 
explicitly.155 
B. Interpleader as an Attempt to Take Control of Litigation 
In the 1960’s, in several suits, members of the insurance industry attempted 
to take control of litigation as well.156 In these cases, they used the tool of 
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interpleader– “a procedural device designed to settle conflicting claims to 
property usually . . . held by a non-claimant without exposing the possessor to 
multiple or inconsistent judgments.”157 In each case, courts were careful to 
conduct fact specific analyses when allowing defendants to flip litigation in this 
way because it could take decisions away from victims.158 
For example, in Pan American Fire & Casualty Company v. Revere, the 
court found the defendant was able to use interpleader to join all potential 
claimants of an insurance policy.159 Pan Am. involved a highway accident that 
occurred when a tractor collided with a school bus and caused an additional two 
car pile-up.160 Four people were killed and an additional 23 were injured.161 The 
tractor’s liability insurer brought the interpleader action alleging that the injured 
victims brought multiple claims and asked the court to direct the plaintiffs in 
those actions to assert their claims in this action.162 The court reasoned “[t]he 
function of interpleader is to rescue a debtor from undue harassment when there 
are several claims made against the same fund.”163 
The court also mentioned the plaintiff insurance company had no interest in 
the limited pool of money available to victims.164 Further, if it were the defendant 
in multiple lawsuits, not only would it incur costs exceeding the $100,000 policy 
limit and its contractual obligation, but also an early plaintiff might take the 
entire pot, leaving the others with no recovery.165 The court also explicitly 
mentioned “the victims of the automobile accident should not be enjoined from 
suing at law before a jury,” which indicates the court still intended plaintiffs to 
control their lawsuits in some manner, even if limited to one court proceeding.166 
In conclusion, the court held the insurance company should not be subject to 
multiple liability when the aggregate exceeds the insurance policy limits, so the 
use of interpleader–which allowed the defendant to control some elements of the 
litigation–was an appropriate tool in this case.167 
In State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, the Supreme Court found an 
insurance company exceeded the power granted to it under the federal 
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interpleader statute by attempting to take control of the litigation against it.168 
State Farm involved a car accident between a Greyhound bus and a pickup truck 
that resulted in two deaths and over thirty injuries.169 Four injured plaintiffs 
brought suit against Greyhound, the bus driver, the truck driver, and the truck 
owner in California state court.170 However, before these cases went to trial, State 
Farm brought an interpleader action in the United States District Court for the 
District of Oregon seeking to require all claimants to establish their claims in a 
single proceeding and bring no other action.171 Although the court determined 
that State Farm properly used the interpleader statute, the court found using 
interpleader to grant an order enjoining prosecution of unrelated lawsuits and to 
extend protection to the alleged tortfeasor–State Farm’s insured–was 
inappropriate.172 The court found the “mere existence” of a limited insurance 
fund, made relevant through interpleader, did not allow for control over the 
litigation beyond the needs for an orderly result.173 
The Court reasoned the interpleader device was never intended to be a 
solution to mass tort litigation, nor an “all-purpose bill of peace.”174 If Congress 
did intend this use of interpleader, then Congress would have been clearer about 
making sure that disinterested parties could not “strip truly interested parties of 
substantial rights—such as the right to choose the forum in which to establish 
their claims.”175 The Court found no legislative support for the theory that a 
modern federal interpleader is capable of “sweeping dozens of lawsuits out of the 
various state and federal courts in which they were brought and into a single 
interpleader proceeding.”176 In fact, only two reported cases allowed a federal 
interpleader court to take control of the underlying litigation against alleged 
tortfeasors.177 Therefore, because Congress never intended interpleader to serve 
as a bill of peace in multi-party litigation, State Farm could not use the 
interpleader statute to enjoin claimants from filing suits in forums they prefer.178 
Whether these cases proved to be successful for insurance companies is not 
essential to the argument because either way, win or lose, interpleader is a 
recognized tool that is available to control litigation in a reasonable manner, and 
Congress and state legislatures have recognized it.179 
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C. Other Attempts to Create a Solution to Mass Tort Litigation 
Congress has made other efforts to provide an economically feasible and 
equitable solution to mass tort litigation through creating multiforum, multiparty 
jurisdiction, recognizing class actions, and creating multidistrict litigation 
panels.180 In creating these solutions, Congress has been extremely hesitant to 
change the typical litigation structure.181 
Part one describes the federal statute that provides consolidation of mass tort 
litigation in specific instances.182 Part two describes Rule 23 of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure and the structure of class actions.183 Lastly, part three 
discusses multidistrict litigation as an option in mass tort litigation.184 
1. Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction 
In the late 1970’s, Congress began to consider how it could provide a 
solution for multiforum, mass tort litigation.185 Congress went through many 
steps before enacting section 1369 of the U.S. Code.186 Prior proposals allowed 
for a lower minimum damages requirement of $75,000, rather than the $150,000 
minimum currently enacted, and a lower minimum deaths requirement of 25, 
rather than 75.187 Congress also eliminated the choice of law rules within prior 
proposals and provided a new exception to the minimum diversity rule.188 These 
changes are evidence of Congress’ intent to narrow the cases in which section 
1369 would apply by creating a tighter federal statute for multiparty litigation.189 
The limited scope of those changes indicate Congress’ continued reluctance to 
provide a sweeping solution to mass tort litigation that would limit plaintiffs’ 
freedom to remain in control of their case and choose when and where to sue.190 
The current enactment of section 1369 states, “district courts shall have 
original jurisdiction of any civil action involving minimal diversity between 
adverse parties that arises from a single accident, where at least 75 natural 
 
insurance company’s use of interpleader to join injured parties in one action); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. 
Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967) (limiting an insurance company’s use of interpleader). 
180.  Infra Sections VI.C.1–3 
181.  Id. 
182.  Infra Section VI.C.1. 
183.  Infra Section VI.C.2. 
184.  Infra Section VI.C.3.  
185.  Thomas Reavley & Jerome Wesevich, Choice of Law Under the Multiparty Multiforum Trial 
Jurisdiction Act of 2002, REGENT UNIV. L. REV. 157, 167–68 (2004).  
186.  Id. at 167–72. 
187.  CRS Report for Congress, Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002, P.L. 107-273 
(2002). 
188.  Id.  
189.  Id. 
190.  See generally CRS Report for Congress, supra note 188 (explaining the changes that Congress 
made to prior proposals before enacting the Act). 
2019 / The Route 91 Harvest Festival Shooting: How MGM Is Attempting to 
Escape Liability 
198 
persons have died in the accident at a discrete location” if any two of the 
defendants are from different states.191 The term accident means “a sudden 
accident, or a natural event culminating in an accident.”192 Further, “any person 
with a claim arising from the accident described . . . shall be permitted to 
intervene as a party plaintiff in the action, even if that person could not have 
brought an action in a district court as an original matter.”193 
Although the Route 91 case likely would not qualify because 58 people died 
and the majority of all plaintiffs and defendants are citizens of the same state, it is 
evident from the enactment of this federal statute that: (1) Congress is capable of 
providing a solution to mass torts in certain situations, and (2) Congress is clear 
when it does so.194 
2. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure–Rule 23 
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs modern class-action 
procedure.195 A class action can be created “if the ‘court finds that the questions 
of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to 
other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the 
controversy.’”196 Advocates of using Rule 23 see a potential solution to mass tort 
litigation because “[c]ombining the aggregation power of the Rule 23 joinder 
mechanism with settlement procedures could substantially facilitate the 
disposition of multiple actions, eliminating troublesome choice-of-law issues and 
reducing transaction costs.”197 
Rule 23 currently leaves open the option for plaintiffs to create class actions 
in mass tort situations–“the small opening for class-action treatment of certain 
well-qualified mass-tort cases should remain.”198 Through its enactment of Rule 
23, Congress has expressed its view that plaintiffs should be in charge of their 
own litigation and has provided another solution to mass tort actions.199 
 
191.  28 U.S.C.A. § 1369 (Westlaw current through P.L. 116-5). 
192.  Id. 
193.  Id. 
194.  See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1369 (Westlaw current through P.L. 116-5) (enacting a federal statute to express 
Congress’ intent to provide a specific solution for mass tort litigation). 
195.  John K. Rabiej, The Making of Class Action Rule 23-What Were We Thinking?, 24 MISS. C. L. REV. 
323, 323–24 (2005). 
196.  Id. at 325. 
197.  Id. at 342. 
198.  Id. at 343. 
199.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (Westlaw 2019) (enacting a federal rule of civil procedure to express 
Congress’ intent to provide a specific solution for mass tort litigation). 
The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 51 
199 
3. Multidistrict Litigation 
Multidistrict litigation (“MDL") allows for coordinated or consolidated 
pretrial proceedings that may be transferred to any district “when civil actions 
involving one or more common questions of fact are pending in different 
districts.”200 Litigants have polarized views when it comes to 
multidistrict litigation, with plaintiffs generally preferring to “litigate in state 
court and defendants prefer[ring] to litigate in federal court.”201 However, the 
judicial panel determines transfers on the basis of “convenience of parties and 
witnesses,” and in order to promote “just and efficient conduct of such 
actions.”202 
When enacting the multidistrict litigation statute, Congress created another 
potential avenue for mass tort litigation.203 In fact, MGM used this avenue in the 
Route 91 case when it moved to transfer and centralize the case to a single 
district court.204 This shows parties can use Congress’ alternative avenue; 
however, MGM’s motion to transfer to a single district court under the 
multidistrict litigation statute was denied by the panel of judges.205 MGM 
attempted to centralize 13 actions that were pending in 8 different districts 
through a motion to centralize pre-trial proceedings in one California MDL 
proceeding.206 
The MDL panel reasoned that “merely to avoid different federal courts 
having to decide the same issues is, by itself usually not sufficient to justify . . . 
centralization.”207 The court further reasoned because there were a “minimal 
number of actions” at issue, the actions were mostly coordinated together, and a 
“significant overlap of counsel” existed, “voluntary cooperation and 
coordination” was feasible.208 Therefore, MGM’s attempt to use an MDL forum 
failed because the underlying policy behind MDLs was not apparent, that being 
“minimiz[ing] the potential for duplicative discovery and inconsistent pretrial 
rulings.”209 
In summary, the common law and Congress have recognized potential 
solutions to help organize mass tort litigation and provide efficiency for the 
courts and litigants: interpleader, section 1369, class actions, and multidistrict 
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litigation forums.210 Congress has not however enacted a bill of peace as a 
solution for mass torts; therefore, MGM’s attempt to make one as a solution to 
shield itself from liability is outside of its legally recognizable options as a 
potential defendant.211 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Congress spoke clearly when it enacted the SAFETY Act of 2002.212 Further, 
the text, purpose, and legislative history reveal that allowing MGM to use the 
SAFETY Act to shield itself from liability would expand the Act’s scope beyond 
the enacting Congress intended.213 Further, Congress did not intend for the 
SAFETY Act to provide potentially liable victims a bar to liability for unknown 
negligence, or at the very least, negligence unrelated to the anti-terrorism 
technology.214 Lastly, MGM is unable to use the SAFETY Act of 2002 because 
the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security has not defined the Route 
91 Harvest Festival Shooting as a terrorist attack, nor has she established CSC 
provided anti-terrorism technology under the Act’s requirements.215 
Congress has implemented other potential solutions to mass tort litigation, 
for example, U.S. code section 1369, multidistrict litigation, and class actions.216 
Therefore, those are the available tools for the Route 91 litigation, and using the 
SAFETY Act to take control of litigation and forum shop for defense-friendly 
federal judges is improper.217 If Congress intended to enact a bill of peace or a 
sweeping rule to limit mass-tort damages through its enactment of the SAFETY 
Act, it would have done so deliberately and would have been clear about its 
purpose.218 Congress’ lack of action in creating a bill of peace or something 
similar, and its hesitation in allowing defendants to control litigation, further 
support Congress’ intent regarding the SAFETY Act.219 Regardless if a court 
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finds MGM negligent, injured victims should be able to file their own lawsuits 
addressing their grievances, have a court of law hear their claims, and be the 
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